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Collaborative Reasoning: Evidence for 
Collective Rationality
David Moshman and Molly Geil 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Reasoning may be defi ned as a deliberate effort to coordinate inferences so as 
to reach justifi able conclusions. Thus defi ned, reasoning includes collaborative 
as well as individual forms of cognitive action. The purpose of the present study 
was to demonstrate a circumstance in which collaborative reasoning is qualita-
tively superior to individual reasoning. The selection task, a well known logical 
hypothesis-testing problem, was presented to 143 college undergraduates—32 
individuals and 20 groups of 5 or 6 interacting peers. The correct (falsifi cation) 
response pattern was selected by only 9% of the individuals but by 75% of the 
groups. The superior performance of the groups was due to collaborative rea-
soning rather than to imitation or peer pressure. Groups typically co-constructed 
a structure of arguments qualitatively more sophisticated than that generated by 
most individuals. The results support Piagetian and Habermasian views of peer 
interaction as a locus of rational social processes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning may be defi ned as a deliberate effort to coordinate inferences in such 
a way as to reach justifi able conclusions (Moshman, 1995, 1998). Typically, we 
think of reasoning as a cognitive action performed by an individual. As defi ned 
here, however, reasoning may also be a social process. We may use the term 
collaborative reasoning for cases in which two or more individuals deliberately 
coordinate their thinking for the shared purpose of achieving justifi able results. 
A key aspect of reasoning—individual or collaborative—is testing hypothe-
ses against data (Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Mosh-
man, 1998). Good hypothesis-testing requires, among other things, insight into 
the role of falsifi cation: In order to genuinely test an hypothesis one must seek 
evidence that would falsify that hypothesis rather than simply accumulate evi-
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dence consistent with it. A great deal of recent research has therefore focused 
on the extent to which people have this basic insight concerning the logic of hy-
pothesis-testing and apply it in testing hypotheses. 
Much of the research directly addressing the use of a falsifi cation strategy in 
hypothesis-testing has involved the selection task, in which individuals are pre-
sented with a hypothesis concerning a set of four cards and are asked to decide 
which cards must be examined to determine whether the hypothesis is true or 
false. In the original version of the task (Wason, 1966), the hypothesis proposes 
an arbitrary connection between letters and numbers appearing on the cards. It 
is well established that, in this version, very few college students select for ex-
amination those cards—and only those cards—that could falsify the hypothesis 
(Green, 1995; Griggs, 1995; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
Research has shown that the frequency of correct selections can be substan-
tially enhanced through variations on the standard instructions, content, and/or 
context of the selection task. Not all variations yield better performance, how-
ever, and there has been considerable dispute about the explanation for selec-
tion task behavior under various circumstances (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Ev-
ans, 1995). Some researchers and theorists have concluded that people lack any 
sort of abstract falsifi cation insight. To the extent that people test hypotheses 
successfully in certain circumstances it is through the use of domain-specifi c 
pragmatic reasoning schemata (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak, Nis-
bett, & Oliver, 1986), concrete mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), 
or nonrational heuristics (Evans, 1989; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995). Oth-
ers argue, following Piaget (1972), that an abstract understanding of the role of 
falsifi cation in hypothesis-testing develops over the course of adolescence but 
that strategic application of that competence depends on a variety of situational 
and task variables (Bady, 1979; Moshman, 1979; Overton, 1990; Overton et al., 
1987; Ward & Overton, 1990). 
Notwithstanding their differences, these various theorists share a focus on the 
competence (or incompetence) of the individual. Correspondingly, research on 
the selection task, like most psychological research on reasoning, has focused 
on the performance of individuals working alone. In everyday life, however, a 
great deal of reasoning is collaborative. Although groups are subject to a vari-
ety of biases and often show levels of cognitive performance equal or inferior to 
the performance of their average members (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hinsz, Tin-
dale, & Vollrath, 1997; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996), research on collabor-
ative learning, problem-solving, and decision-making has provided convincing 
evidence for the cognitive value of peer interaction (Azmitia & Montgomery, 
1993; Cohen, 1994; Dimant & Bearison, 1991; Doise & Mugny, 1984; Kruger, 
1992, 1993; Moscovici & Doise, 1994; Phelps & Damon, 1989). One may thus 
wonder whether groups of people reasoning together would show better perfor-
mance on the selection task than isolated individuals. 
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Over the past two decades, the fi rst author has presented dozens of under-
graduate and graduate classes with the original version of the selection task, re-
corded students’ initial responses on the blackboard, and then asked them to 
discuss the task with each other and reach a consensus solution. Although few 
students initially choose the correct (falsifi cation) pattern, it is usually the solu-
tion adopted by the class. The decision process, moreover, is highly rational: in-
dividuals present a variety of views about which cards should or should not be 
turned, they present arguments for and against these various views, and typ-
ically, over the course of 20–40 minutes, they increasingly comprehend and 
adopt the falsifi cationist logic underlying the logically appropriate selections. 
The classes thus appear to achieve a qualitatively higher level of perfor-
mance than individual students. That is, most classes agree to turn those cards, 
and only those cards, that could falsify the hypothesis, demonstrating a level of 
metalogical understanding that is rarely seen in individuals responding to the 
same task. The purpose of the present research was to replicate these classroom 
observations under more controlled conditions. 
METHOD
Subjects 
Participants were 143 students from undergraduate educational psychology 
courses, about equally divided between women and men. Students participated 
in the study as one means of fulfi lling a class requirement. 
Materials 
Students were asked to complete the original version of the selection task (Wa-
son, 1966). They were presented with four cards pictured on a sheet of paper. 
Each card had either a letter or a number on it. The letter E was shown on the 
fi rst card, K on the second card, 4 on the third card, and 7 on the fourth card. It 
was indicated that each card pictured had a letter on one side and a number on 
the other. Below the letters was the following hypothesis: “If a card has a vowel 
on one side then it has an even number on the other side.” Students were asked 
to test the hypothesis by selecting the card(s) they would need to turn over to 
determine conclusively whether the hypothesis was true or false for the set of 
four cards shown. At the bottom of the page students were asked to justify their 
solution in writing, a requirement that, by itself, does not typically improve per-
formance (Griggs, 1995). 
Design 
Students were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: (a) an 
individual control condition, (b) an interactive group, or (c) an individual/ inter-
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active group. The 32 students assigned to the individual condition were asked to 
solve the selection task individually. The 54 students assigned to the interactive 
condition addressed the task collectively in 10 groups of 5 or 6 members each. 
The 57 students assigned to the individual/interactive condition considered the 
task fi rst individually and then in 10 groups of 5 or 6 members each. 
Procedure 
All sessions were conducted by the second author. Prior to beginning the task, 
students were read a set of general instructions informing them that the purpose 
of the study was to investigate problem-solving. Students were told they would 
be required to justify their response to the problem in writing. Students were 
also encouraged to spend enough time on the task so that they were content with 
their solution. 
After receiving general instructions, students were given a set of instructions 
for the “four card task.” The experimenter emphasized that “all cards have a let-
ter on one side and a number on the other.” 
During the problem-solving activity the experimenter left the room and 
watched through a one-way mirror. All sessions were videotaped. Total time to 
complete the task was recorded for each individual and each group. If a group 
did not reach consensus after 25 minutes, the experimenter returned and told 
the group they had 10 minutes to reach consensus. Only one group was unable 
to reach consensus after 35 minutes, at which time the experimenter intervened 
and told the students to justify their individual responses for the remaining 10 
minutes. (During that time, it turned out, a consensus was reached.) 
Students in the individual condition recorded their selections and provided 
written justifi cations. They were told that they should take as much time as neces-
sary to make a justifi able selection, that they must participate in the study for the 
allotted 50 minutes to earn class credit, and that they were not expected to get be-
yond the initial task. After making and justifying his or her selections, each stu-
dent was given the correct solution and was asked to justify it in writing. 
Members of each interactive group were directed by the experimenter to 
work together to solve the problem. After the group reached what appeared to 
be a unanimous judgment, students recorded and explained the solution indi-
vidually. They were told that they could continue to discuss their conclusions if 
group members wished. 
Members of each individual/interactive group were directed that they should 
fi rst solve the problem individually and explain their selections in writing, and 
then discuss their selections with each other in order to achieve a consensus. Af-
ter the group reached what appeared to be a unanimous judgment, students re-
corded and explained the solution individually. They were told that they could 
continue to discuss their conclusions if group members wished. 
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RESULTS
To comprehend the logic of the selection task one must realize that only a p to-
gether with a not-q falsifi es a hypothesis of the form If p then q. Thus the cards 
to be turned are the p, which could have a not-q on the other side, and the not-q, 
which could have a p. For the hypothesis “If vowel then even” and the present 
cards, then, one must turn the E, which would falsify the hypothesis if it had an 
odd number on the other side, and the 7, which would falsify the hypothesis if it 
had a vowel on the other side. 
We focus fi rst on the cards selected by individuals and groups. To discern 
how peer interaction affected individual responses, data from the individual/ in-
teractive groups are then examined in detail. 
Individuals vs. Groups 
In the individual condition, 9.4% selected the correct p and not-q combination. 
In the interactive condition, 70% of the groups selected the correct p and not-q 
combination; in the individual/interactive condition, 80% of the groups selected 
this combination. Thus, correct selection patterns were far more common in the 
group conditions than in the individual condition, χ2 (1, N = 52) = 23.42, P < 
.001. The difference between interactive and individual/interactive groups was 
not signifi cant, χ 2 (1, N = 20) = 0.27, P > .05. The card combinations selected 
by students in all conditions are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1
Patterns Selected by Individuals and Groups
                                                    Condition 
Selection        Individual     Interactive    Individual/Interactive 
                          Pattern          Group              Group 
pq¯   3  7  8 
pqq¯   0  0  1 
p  5  2  1 
p q  14  0  0 
All cards  2  1  0 
Other  8  0  0 
Total  32  10  10 
The “¯” above a letter indicates “not.” The correct selection is pq¯. No 
pattern in the “other” category was selected by more than two individuals 
or by any group. 
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Individual Responses in the Individual/Interactive Condition 
Responses of students in the individual/interactive condition were analyzed 
with respect to any change between the initial and fi nal pattern selected by 
group members. A change in reasoning was regarded as positive if an individu-
al’s initial response was incorrect (any card combination other than p and not-
q) but his or her fi nal response was correct. If the initial response was correct 
but the fi nal response was incorrect, the change was considered negative. Table 
2 shows the initial and fi nal responses for all individuals in the individual/inter-
active condition. 
Of 57 students, 37 had a change in the correctness of their pattern selection 
after collaborating with others in their group (i.e. the falsifi cation pattern was 
their initial or fi nal selection but not both). Of these 37, 35 students showed pos-
itive change; only two students changed in a negative direction (binomial P < 
.001). Thus, most individuals showed a change in the correctness of their se-
lection as a result of group interaction and almost all of these changes were in a 
positive direction. 
Individual/Interactive Group Patterns 
Because individuals in the individual/interactive condition responded to the task 
prior to peer interaction, it was possible to relate group decisions to initial indi-
vidual responses. Three of the individual/interactive groups initially contained a 
majority response. In each of these groups the p and q combination was the ma-
jority (but not unanimous) initial response. Two of these three groups switched 
TABLE 2
Initial and Final Patterns Selected by Members of 
Individual/Interactive Groups
                                     Final Selection Pattern 
Initial Selection 
Pattern     pq¯                pqq¯                     p             Total 
p q¯ 10  1  1  12 
pq q¯   2  0  0  2 
p  4  0  2  6 
p q  21  4  2  27 
All cards  4  1  0  5 
p p  3  0  1  4 
p  1  0  0  1 
Total  45  6  6  57 
The “¯” above a letter indicates “not.” The correct selection is p q¯. 
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to the correct pattern after collaboration. In three other groups, although there 
was no majority response, p and q was the modal (i.e. most frequent) initial re-
sponse. Again, two of these groups selected the correct pattern after collabora-
tion. In one group the modal response was to turn all four cards, but after col-
laborating the group selected the correct pattern. The remaining three groups 
initially contained no modal response. All three of these groups selected the cor-
rect p and not-q combination after collaboration. 
Individual/interactive groups also varied with respect to whether or not they 
contained individuals who selected the correct pattern initially. Seven of the ten 
groups had at least one member who initially selected the correct p and not-q 
combination. In no case was this the modal response. Nonetheless, fi ve of these 
groups selected the correct pattern after collaboration; only two did not. In the 
remaining three groups, none of the members initially selected the correct re-
sponse. Nevertheless, each of these groups ultimately agreed on the correct p 
and not-q combination. Thus, having a member who initially selected the cor-
rect cards was neither a necessary nor suffi cient condition for group success. 
Examples of Collaborative Reasoning 
With rare exceptions involving developmental progress in children (Doise & 
Mugny, 1984), research suggests that group performance on cognitive tasks is 
typically within the range of individual performance (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; 
Kerr et al., 1996). At the upper limit, on tasks with demonstrably correct solu-
tions, a group may perform at the level of its best member (Laughlin & Ellis, 
1986). Presumably, the individual who best comprehends the logic of the task is 
able to convince the others of his or her view. Of particular interest in the pres-
ent study, then, are the three groups in which no member initially made the cor-
rect selection. In order to illustrate the process of collaborative reasoning, we 
present summaries of the discussion for two of these groups (the videotape of 
the third was accidentally destroyed). 
Group 1 (clockwise around the table) consisted of Alice, Ben, Carol, Dan, and 
Earl (the names are fi ctitious but Alice and Carol were female and the others 
male). In their initial individual selections, everyone but Alice proposed turning 
only the E and 4 cards. Alice proposed E, 4, and 7. 
At the onset of discussion, everyone immediately agrees that E should be 
turned to see if it has an even number on the other side, 4 should be turned to 
see if it has a vowel, and the other two cards need not be turned because the 
hypothesis does not address them. Alice notes that she had proposed turning E, 
4, and 7 but dismisses her selection of 7 as simply a mistake. “I was thinking 
that it was even for some strange reason,” she laughs. “I wasn’t thinking, that 
was it!” 
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As the discussion proceeds, however, with Alice, Ben, Carol, and Dan rein-
forcing each other’s statements as to the relevance of E and 4 to the hypothesis 
and the irrelevance of K and 7 to the hypothesis, Alice suddenly seems to take 
her initial selection of 7 more seriously: 
Alice:  Maybe 7 has a vowel on the other side. 
Ben:  It could, but as far as this hypothesis here it just doesn’t matter. 
Alice:  But if it has… 
Dan:  It just says if it has a vowel on one side. 
Alice:  Yeah, but it says if it has a vowel on one side, then it has an even num-
ber on the other side. 
Dan:  So maybe we’re wrong. 
Carol  [surprised and excited]: Oh that’s true! 
Alice:  7 could have a vowel on the other side. 
Everyone agrees that the issue is more complex than it initially appeared. 
Ben proposes that turning the E and 4 would “test” the hypothesis and fi nding 
an even number and a vowel respectively on the reverse of those cards would 
“support it as opposed to proving it,” but suggests that “we couldn’t prove it un-
less we turned over all of them.” After substantial discussion about the mechan-
ics of turning four cards simultaneously and keeping track of which is which, 
Dan abruptly focuses the conversation on K: 
Dan:  Do we need to turn over K?
Alice:  I don’t think so because …
Dan:  We don’t have to turn over K.
Alice:  We’re concerned with vowels.
Dan:  It has a letter and a number and we know that that one [the K] has a 
letter and it’s not a vowel.
Alice:  Yeah. 
Carol:  But what if it has an even number on the other side? 
Dan:  It doesn’t say anything about … 
Alice:  It doesn’t say that if it’s a consonant … 
Dan:  It just says if it has a vowel. It doesn’t say if it has a consonant it can’t 
have any of them. 
Carol:  That’s true. 
Dan:  I don’t think we have to turn over K. 
There is a pause in the conversation until Carol, apparently convinced that 
turning K is not necessary and now wondering whether 4 is also unnecessary, 
adds “and it doesn’t say that if it has an even number on one side it has a vowel 
on the other.” After another pause she adds, “Really we don’t need to turn over 
4.” She and Ben expand on this as follows: 
Carol: You don’t have to turn over 4 because it [the hypothesis] says if it has 
a vowel on one side it has an even number on the other side. 
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Ben:  It doesn’t say if it has an even number on one side it has a vowel on 
the other. 
Alice and Dan continue to insist that the 4 must be turned, however. After 
discussion among all four, Carol starts to explain that the 4 “could have a con-
sonant on the other side and it still wouldn’t …” but Alice interjects, “Yeah, but 
we need to check it because it is an even number, so we have to fi nd out if it has 
a vowel on the other side.” Carol reluctantly concurs: “Yeah, I guess.” 
Alice then continues, explaining that, in addition to 4, the E must be turned 
because “we have to fi nd out if it’s an even number” and the 7 must be turned 
because “we need to fi nd out if it’s a consonant or a vowel because if it’s a 
vowel then it’s false.” Ben and Carol express continuing uncertainty about the 
4, however. Ben wonders about the implications of it having a consonant on the 
reverse side, leading Carol to observe that turning the 4 would “prove” the hy-
pothesis if there were a vowel on the reverse side and “wouldn’t do anything” 
if there were a consonant. “It would either prove it or it wouldn’t do anything,” 
she concludes. “The 7 and the E are the only ones that can disprove it.” 
There is a very long pause, during which Alice, looking back at the instruc-
tions, can be heard murmuring, “to determine conclusively.” Finally, Dan gets 
the discussion going again and, with input from everyone, a new consensus is 
reached: 
Dan:  Okay, we have to turn over E for sure, right? 
Carol:  Yeah. 
Dan:  Because it has a vowel on one side and we need to fi nd out if it has an 
even number on the other. K we don’t have to worry about because it 
doesn’t say anything about … 
Ben:  … consonants … 
Dan:  … having a consonant. 
Alice:  It doesn’t say if it has a consonant it’s odd or whatever. 
Dan:  And 4 … 
Ben:  I think we need to turn 4. 
Dan:  I think we have to turn over 4 because … 
Earl:  It’s the same as E, really. 
Alice:  It’s the same as E, yeah, we know it’s an even number so we have to 
fi nd out if it has … 
Dan:  Well maybe we don’t. [He pauses, then proceeds slowly, with Carol 
nodding and murmuring assent.] If it has a consonant on one side it 
doesn’t matter if it has an odd or an even number. So it really doesn’t 
matter if we look at 4. Does it? Do you see that? 
Alice and Ben (simultaneously):  I see what you’re saying. 
Dan:  It can tell us where that’s right, but it can’t tell us it’s wrong. 
Carol:  Yeah. 
Dan:  And 7 I think we have to turn over. ‘Cause we need to fi nd out if that 
has a vowel. 
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Carol:  Because it can prove right or wrong. 
Dan:  Because it can prove it wrong. 
The group then confi rms that consensus has been reached: 
Ben:  So are we narrowing it down to E and 7 this time? 
Dan:  I think so. 
Carol:  I think it should be E and 7 now. 
Dan:  I do too. 
Ben:  That’s pretty interesting to watch us all concur. 
Alice:  I wouldn’t have come up with this if we hadn’t, you know, talked 
 about it. 
Carol:  I know, I was totally set on E and 4. 
Ben:  We all were. 
After brief additional discussion reviewing the irrelevance of 4 and the irre-
versibility of the hypothesis, each of the fi ve students independently wrote on 
his or her fi nal task sheet that only the E and 7 should be turned and each pro-
vided a written explanation consistent with the group’s fi nal arguments. 
Group 2 (clockwise around the table) consisted of Frank, Gwen, Hal, Ike, and 
Jay (again the names are fi ctitious but Gwen is female and the others male). In 
their initial individual selections, Hal proposed to turn only the E, Frank pro-
posed E, 4, and 7, and the other three proposed E and 4. 
The discussion begins with Jay suggesting and Gwen agreeing that E and 4 
are the cards that must be turned. Frank also agrees that E and 4 must be turned 
but notes that he selected 7 as well. Reviewing his reasoning, he explains that E 
must be turned because it is a vowel and K need not be turned “because we’re 
not concerned with a consonant having an odd or even; we’re talking about just 
the vowel card.” With respect to the other side of the 4, he starts to explain, “if 
that’s a vowel, then …” Hal interrupts: “See, that doesn’t have to be a vowel, 
though.” Gwen objects, “Yeah, it does,” but Hal goes on to explain his view, 
concluding, with respect to the hypothesis: 
All that that’s saying is that all the vowels have to have even numbers on the 
other side. But it’s not saying that like the number 4 has to have a vowel on the 
other side. 
Frank and Gwen agree now, and Hal goes on: 
The only thing that you have to turn over is E, but by turning over E you’re 
just supporting the hypothesis, you’re not proving. The only way you can 
prove that thing right is if you have all the vowels facing up and then you turn 
all of them over. You know what I’m saying? That’s the only way you can 
prove that hypothesis correct. 
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Frank now asserts “you’d have to turn over 7.” Hal responds, “you’d have to 
turn over all of the vowels and they’d have to be facing up too. You couldn’t 
have one facing the other way because you wouldn’t know.” Gwen and Jay 
agree; further discussion among Frank, Gwen, and Hal addresses the require-
ments of the task, the need to turn E, and the irrelevance of K and 4. Frank then 
returns to the question of the 7 card: 
Frank:  But we would have to turn over the 7, then. Because a vowel like an I 
or  
an O would throw us off. 
Gwen:  You’re right, we wouldn’t be sure of the 7. 
Frank:  So, the E and the 7? 
Gwen:  Yeah. 
Hal:  Yeah, that’s a good point. 
Gwen:  It is a good point. [Pause.] So we’ve decided E and 7 because we want 
to know if E has an even number under it and if 7 has a vowel under it 
or a consonant. 
Frank:  That would disprove it. 
Gwen:  Right. That’s interesting. 
Frank goes on to explain again that “we do not need to turn over card K be-
cause our hypothesis is not concerned with a consonant having an odd or even 
number,” and then he and Gwen summarize the case for choosing 7 as follows: 
Frank:  If card 7 is a consonant, our hypothesis, no, if card 7 is a vowel …
Gwen:  …vowel, then the hypothesis is false.
Frank:  Right.
There appeared to be general assent at this point and each student then indi-
cated the choice of E and 7 on his or her fi nal task sheet and provided an expla-
nation consistent with the group’s fi nal arguments. 
DISCUSSION
It appears that, under the conditions of the present research, most groups, but 
few individuals, applied a falsifi cation strategy in testing a hypothesis. Groups, 
in other words, typically acted in accord with logical norms of hypothesis-test-
ing, whereas individuals did not. Results from the individual/interactive condi-
tion, moreover, indicate achievement of a genuine consensus: after participating 
in group discussion of the selection task, individuals usually rejected their ini-
tial response in favor of the falsifi cation pattern. Insight into the logic of falsifi -
cation, it appears, is more readily achieved in collaborative reasoning than in in-
dividual reasoning. 
Our discussion of these results addresses three general issues. First, we con-
sider and reject the possibility that the evidence for superior group performance 
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is an artifact of our methodology or the result of nonrational social infl uences. 
Second, we examine the nature of collective rationality, concluding that the 
groups in our study engaged in a process of argumentation involving the co-
construction of a collective “reckoning.” Finally, we consider the relation of 
collective rationality to individual rationality. 
Nonrational Infl uences on Group Behavior 
A variety of factors may be invoked in explaining the present evidence. Roughly, 
two general categories of explanation may be differentiated. One type of ac-
count for the superiority of group performance and the change in individual re-
sponse patterns during peer interaction would emphasize factors such as time 
on task, individual infl uence, or concurrence-seeking behavior (Russell, Mills, 
& Reiff-Musgrove, 1990; Veiga, 1991). An alternative approach to the role 
of peer interaction highlights rational group processes including clear formu-
lation and communication of ideas, critical evaluation of proposed judgments 
and choices, refl ection on assumptions and perspectives, and free discussion of 
alternatives (Azmitia & Montgomery, 1993; Binkley, 1995; Dimant & Beari-
son, 1991; Doise & Mugny, 1984; Goldman, 1994; Habermas, 1990; Kruger, 
1992, 1993; Meloth & Deering, 1994; Moscovici & Doise, 1994; Moshman, 
1995, 1998; Phelps & Damon, 1989; Piaget, 1965, 1995; Salmon & Zeitz, 1995; 
Slade, 1995; Wheatley, 1991; Youniss & Damon, 1992). 
With respect to nonrational variables, one potential explanation for the su-
periority of group performance is that groups simply took more time to evalu-
ate their selection patterns before agreeing on a response. Groups did indeed, 
on average, take about two and a half times as long as individuals to make a 
selection. Students in the individual condition, however, were encouraged to 
take as much time as necessary to make a selection they were content with and 
could justify in writing. Moreover, they were told they must participate in the 
study for the allotted 50 minutes to receive class credit, and that they were not 
expected to get beyond the task. Thus, they were given every reason to take 
their time. 
When students in the individual condition fi nished responding, they were 
given the correct solution to the task and asked to justify it. If time were a sig-
nifi cant factor in outcome, then giving students the right answer and encour-
aging them to further refl ect on the task might have improved understanding. 
There was little evidence of such improvement, however. In fact, 49% of the 
students who were asked to justify the correct response pattern either argued 
that the p and not-q combination was incorrect or indicated that they did not 
know why you would turn those cards. Most of the remaining 51% gave ambig-
uous justifi cations. Evans and Wason (1976) found that their students were more 
likely than ours to accept and justify the correct solution when it was presented 
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to them, but found that incorrect solutions were also accepted and rationalized. 
It appears unlikely, in any event, that the effects of peer interaction were due 
simply to the fact that groups spent more time on the task than individuals. 
Another possible explanation for group performance and changes in individ-
ual response patterns is conformity to peer pressure. The response patterns in 
the individual/interactive condition do not support this explanation, however. In 
none of those 10 groups was the correct pattern chosen by a majority of individ-
uals prior to the discussion; in fact, it was never even the most common pattern. 
Thus the dramatic increase in correct responding associated with group discus-
sion was not a matter of conformity to the initial majority or modal view. 
It might be suggested that even if the correct pattern was not initially most 
common, those arguing for it were individuals with greater social infl uence. The 
participants in the study, however, were all randomly assigned undergraduates; 
there was no reason why those arguing for any particular response would be 
seen, independent of the quality of their arguments, as more knowledgeable or 
worthy of emulation than those arguing for any other response. It is notewor-
thy, moreover, that in three of the ten individual/interactive groups not a sin-
gle student initially chose the correct response. Agreement on the correct re-
sponse was nonetheless reached in all three of these groups. It seems likely, 
then, that social interaction increased correct responding to the selection task 
not by coercing conformity but by facilitating genuine insight into logical as-
pects of hypothesis-testing. 
Collective Rationality as Co-constructive Argumentation 
In every individual/interactive group, the initial selections included at least two 
different responses to the task. Videotapes of the discussions show that students 
routinely challenged each other to justify their selections and encouraged each 
other to consider consequences and alternatives. As illustrated earlier, fi nal se-
lections generally appeared to refl ect voluntary agreement based on genuine in-
sight into the logic of the task. Our tapes reveal little evidence of passive con-
formity to majority views or to the views of an apparent expert. On the contrary, 
we routinely see students attempting to reach a genuine consensus by sharing 
insights, perspectives, reasons, doubts, and possibilities. 
Research on group cognitive performance shows that on tasks with demon-
strably correct solutions groups frequently perform at the level of their best 
member (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Kerr et al., 1996; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). 
This suggests that collective rationality may be a matter of rational group 
choice. Given two or more potential solutions to a problem and arguments for 
and against these various solutions, groups are likely to choose the most defen-
sible solution rather than the solution initially favored by the largest number of 
group members. 
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Such a conception, however, is insuffi cient to explain our results. In partic-
ular, it cannot account for the three groups in our study that reached consensus 
on the correct selection pattern despite the fact that no member of the group ini-
tially selected this pattern. We thus consider again the nature of the discussions 
in the two groups presented in detail earlier. 
In Group 1, four of the fi ve students are highly involved in formulating the 
group response. Alice is the only student who initially proposed turning the 7, 
and is the fi rst to note that it could have a vowel on the reverse side. Ben is the 
fi rst to make a distinction between “supporting” the hypothesis and “proving” 
it, but mistakenly concludes that all four cards must be turned to prove the hy-
pothesis. Dan then takes the lead in arguing that, notwithstanding Ben’s point, 
there is no need to turn the K. Carol then expands on Dan’s arguments to make 
the case that there is also no need to turn the 4, initially convincing Ben but not 
Alice or Dan. Alice then notes that the 7 could falsify the hypothesis. Later, 
when the conversation returns to 4, Carol notes that the 4 could not disprove the 
hypothesis whereas the E and 7 could. It is Dan, however, who later establishes 
that the group has agreed to turn 7 and who provides what turns out to be the 
decisive argument for not turning 4. 
In Group 2, three of the fi ve students play major roles in the discussion. 
Frank is a persistent advocate for turning the 7, fi nally convincing the others. 
Hal makes the case that the 4 need not be turned, though initially in the context 
of arguing that one need only turn E. Gwen initially insists that 4 must be turned 
but is convinced by Hal’s argument against this. She later is the fi rst to appre-
ciate the signifi cance of Frank’s argument for turning 7 and plays a key role in 
helping him clarify it and convince the others. 
It appears, then, that at least seven of the ten students in these two groups 
were actively engaged in a process of collaborative reasoning that generated a 
higher level of understanding than any of them alone could muster. Although 
the process included rational choices among confl icting alternatives, the alterna-
tives were not complete solutions but component ideas. Group 2, for example, 
ultimately accepted Frank’s argument for turning the 7 and Hal’s argument for 
not turning the 4, although each was initially alone in his choice. It is notable, 
however, that the group integrated these two insights to generate the correct so-
lution despite the fact that neither Frank, Hal, nor anyone else had initially pro-
posed that solution. 
The process in Group 1 is even more interesting. Here too, the group con-
cluded that 7 must be turned, despite the fact that only one member initially 
made this selection. It is particularly noteworthy, however, that the group also 
agreed that the 4 need not be turned, despite the fact that all fi ve members ini-
tially thought it should. Moreover, it is impossible to identify a particular in-
dividual whose insights and arguments are the basis for the group consensus. 
Carol is the fi rst to propose that 4 should not be turned, but her arguments draw 
on (a) Dan’s case against turning K; (b) an earlier distinction by Ben between 
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“supporting” and “proving” the hypothesis; and (c) Alice’s insight, with regard 
to 7, about the central relevance of falsifi cation. It is Dan, moreover, who ul-
timately, with assistance from Carol, convinces the others that 4 need not be 
turned. The group’s decision not to turn 4, then, is not a choice among confl ict-
ing individual ideas but rather a novel insight co-constructed by four members 
of the group. 
Kruger (1993) raises the question of whether peer interaction with respect to 
cognitive tasks is best construed as a process of confl ict or a process of coopera-
tion. We agree with her conclusion that this is a false dichotomy. There were in-
deed confl icting views, and choices among these views, within every group in 
our study. These confl icts, however, took place within a cooperative context in 
which group members focused not on proving their own views to be correct, but 
on co-constructing a consensus solution that could be justifi ed to everyone’s sat-
isfaction. The result for each group was not just a pattern of choices but a struc-
ture of arguments justifying those choices, a collective version of what Binkley 
(1995) labels a “reckoning.” The higher level of understanding achieved by 
most groups, then, may be conceptualized as a well elaborated collective reck-
oning, in this case a structure of arguments supporting the selection of E and 7 
and explaining the irrelevance of K and 4. 
Individual and Collective Rationality 
Although the primary focus of the present research was on collaborative reason-
ing, it is not our intent to downplay the importance of individual reasoning or 
to sharply distinguish individual and collective rationality. Green (1995) argues 
convincingly that individual thinking about the selection task involves a process 
of internal argumentation. Developmental psychologists, moreover, increasingly 
construe individual cognition not as a single equilibrated structure but rather 
as an interplay of competing ideas, strategies, and perspectives (Kuhn, Garcia-
Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; Siegler, 1996). The coordination of compet-
ing arguments to construct a novel reckoning may thus be typical of individual 
as well as collaborative reasoning (cf. Kuhn, 1991). In the case of the selection 
task, however, it appears from our data that groups are more likely than individ-
uals to construct the complete reckoning that supports the correct selection of 
cards. Most groups thus achieve a level of insight qualitatively superior to that 
achieved by most individuals. The process of collaborative reasoning that gen-
erates this higher level of insight, however, may not be qualitatively different 
from individual processes of reasoning. 
Group performance is no doubt constrained by the cognitive competencies 
of the individuals constituting the group. In the present case, for example, the 
success of the groups may depend on the same metalogical understanding of 
falsifi cation that enables individual success by adolescents and adults on other 
versions of the selection task (Bady, 1979; Moshman, 1979; Overton, 1990; 
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Overton et al., 1987; Ward & Overton, 1990). If so, one might expect that peer 
groups of children under age 11 or 12 would fare no better than individual chil-
dren on the present task. 
Rather than view individual competence as a given, however, it is impor-
tant to note that participation in collaborative reasoning may facilitate individ-
ual cognitive progress. Piaget, Habermas, and other theorists have identifi ed 
peer interaction as a locus of rational social processes (Binkley, 1995; Goldman, 
1994; Habermas, 1990; Moscovici & Doise, 1994; Piaget, 1995; Salmon & 
Zeitz, 1995) that promote developmental change (Moshman, 1995, 1998; Piaget, 
1965; Youniss & Damon, 1992). Psychological research has confi rmed that in-
dividuals may progress towards higher levels of cognition as a result of peer in-
teraction (Azmitia & Montgomery, 1993; Dimant & Bearison, 1991; Doise & 
Mugny, 1984; Kruger, 1992, 1993). Peer interaction is, moreover, widely re-
garded as a highly effective basis for education (Cohen, 1994; Meloth & Deer-
ing, 1994; Phelps & Damon, 1989; Slade, 1995; Wheatley, 1991). 
The present results suggest that levels of understanding that are diffi cult to 
elicit in situations of individual performance may emerge in the context of col-
laborative reasoning. We are not proposing that the brief peer interaction expe-
rienced by the participants in the present study produced a generalizable and 
durable change in individual hypothesis-testing competence. It is nevertheless 
plausible that repeated opportunities to participate in sophisticated group rea-
soning may contribute to the development of individual reasoning, which in 
turn enhances the quality of one’s epistemic transactions with others. Human ra-
tionality may thus develop via an ongoing dialectic of individual and collabora-
tive reasoning. 
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